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ABSTRACT
High tax revenues give the government the opportunity to create public
employment. However, if the government tries to increase total tax revenues
by increasing the corporate tax rate, two negative effects are invoked.
Investment decreases, so that generally future tax revenues and private
employment decrease. With the purpose to analyse this trade-off a dynamic
game between the government and a representative firm is formulated. The
government's objective is maximal total employment and the government's
instrument is a corporate tax rate policy. The firm's objective is maximal
total dividends and the firm's instrument is an investment rate policy. In
general it is optimal for the government to start with a low corporate tax
rate and to end with a high corporate tax rate. However, the switchíng time
depends on the credibility and reputation of the government. If the
government is committed to an announced policy, even if this announced
polícy becomes suboptimal over time, and if the firm is expected to believe
so, the open-loop Stackelberg outcome of the game results. If the government
is not committed to an announced policy and if the firm expects rational
behaviour of the government at all times, the feedback Stackelberg outcome
results. It is shown that in the open-loop outcome the switch in policy oc-
curs later and the results are better for both the government end the firm
than in the feedback outcome. Finally, the sensitivity of this switching
time with respect to the capital~labour intensiveness is investigated.
f?r;y words: optimal dynamic taxation, employment policy, theory of the firm,
Lancaster differential game
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1. Introduction
In many countries nowadays unemployment is considered to be one of the most
severe economic problems. The governments have to make a choíce, among other
things, to rely on the private sector to create employment or to create
employment in the public sector. The second possibility is directly
successful but has to be finenced by money creation or taxation. Since money
creation has ita limits (Barro, 19~4), the government's problem focusaes on
the question whether or not the creation of extra public employment with
high taxation is a good employment policy. For a given level of net wages in
the private sector high taxatíon implies less investment possibilities for
the fírms and that might imply lesa employment in the private sector and
less future tax revenues.
This paper intends to formalise end solve the basics of this problem. A
dynamic game model is set up with the government and a representative firm
as players. The government wanta to maximise total employment, which ia the
sum of private and public employment, over some plenning period. The firm
wants to maximise the total stream of dividenda over that same period. It is
assumed that prices and wages are fixed and that the firm can sell what it
wants and can attract the profit maximising emount of labour at each point
of time. It follows that the crucial decision the firm has to make concerns
the division of after-tax profits over investment and dividend (Lesourne,
1976; van Loon, 1982). Investment leads to a growth of the capital stock
with more profits in the future. The instrument of the government in this
model is the corporate tax rate.
The mathematical structure of the model proves to be very similar to the
mathematical structure of the Lancaster (1973) model of capitalism. Because
it can reasonably be assumed that the government has to decide on the tax
policy before the firm makes decisions, the relevant solution concept for
the game is the Stackelberg solution concept. The open-loop Stackelberg
solution is presented before in the literature for the Lancaster game
(Pohjola, 1983), but this result is not fully correct. The correct aolution
will be derived in this paper and will be used to find the optimal
employment policy. Aa usual the open-loop Stackelberg solution displays3
time-inconsistency (Kydland and Prescott, 19~~). A requirement of strong
time-consistency leads to the feedback Stackelberg solution, which will be
shown to be equal to the open-loop Nash solution of this game. Finally, it
will be shown that only in some speciel casea the open-loop Stackelberg
solution for this game is efficient.
In general the solution of the dynamic game leads to a period with a low
corporate tax rate and a high investment rate, end a subsequent period with
s high corporate tax rate and a low inveatment rate. Both players are
willing to be modest for s while in order to accumulate capital stock, which
is beneficial for both of them. Under the requirement of time-consistency
the policy switch occurs earlier with lower total employment end lower total
dividends. This i.s the correct model, when the government can not commit
itself to an announced policy and when the firm expects rational behaviour
of the government at all times. The time-consistent outcome is never
efficient and the time-inconsistent outcome is only efficient, when the
production technology is labour intensive or when the tax rate cannot become
too low. Furthermore, it is shown that the policy switch occurs later for
either a very labour-intensive or a very capital-intensive production
technology.
The paper is organised as followa. Section 2 formulates the differential
game between government and firm. Section 3 derives the relevent solutions
for this differential game. In section 4 the different outcomes are compared
and interpreted. In section 5 the effect of variations in the indicator of
capital~labour intensivenesa is analysed. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. The model
Suppose that the representative firm is operating under a constant-returns-
to-scale production technology of. the Cobb-Douglas type
Q- K~L1-~. 0~ ac ( 1, (1)
where Q denotes production, K denotes capital stock and L denotes labour in
the private sector. It is assumed that the firm is not constrained on both4
output and labour markets. This implies that unemployment correaponds to
classical unemployment in the sense of Malinvaud (1977). Ftirthermore,
suppoeo that the real wage p, 0~ p C 1, is fixed end take For simpliclty
p-1. The assumption of a fixed real wage cen be austained by the theory of
implicit contracts or efficiency wages (Stiglitz, 1986) or by trade union
behaviour (Van der Ploeg, 1987). The maximisation of profit
RzQ-wL (2)
leads to the well-known condition that the marginal productivity of labour
equals the real wage, which implies that labour is a linear function of the
capital stock:
1
L - ((1-a)W)aTC. (3)
Substitution of (1) and then (3) into (2) givea profit as a linear function
of the capital stock:
R-PK.
where the rentability of the capital stock S is given by
(4)
1-1
A - ~((1-a)w)~ . (5)
Investment I accounts for the growth of the capital stock
K(t) ' 1(t). (6)
Without affecting the basic results of the paper it is assumed that there is
no depreciation. Investment can only be financed by retained earnings. The
firm has to decide on the division of after-tax profit R- TX, where TX
denotes total taxation, over dividend D end investment:
R-TX~ D~ I. (7)5
The firm's objective is to maximise the total stream of dividends over a
plenning period [O,T]
T(
J D(t) dt (g)
0
and the firm's instrument is the investment rate i, which is defined as
i- R i TX' 0 t i C 1. (9)
Since the labour input L doea not show up dynamically in the optimisation
problem, it is correct to first maximise profit with respect to L and then
maximise (8) (see e.g. Feichtinger and Hartl, 1986).
It is assumed that the government can use tax income TX to create public
employment for the same wage w as in the private sector. Under the
assumption of Ricardian debt neutrality it does not make any difference,
whether the government is given the opportunity to borrow money or not. The
government's objective is to maximise total employment over a planning
period [O,T]
T
J (L(t) t ~L) dt
0
(10)
and the government's instrument is the corporate tax rate T, which is
defined as
t- TR~ 0 ( ii ( T( i2 C 1, Ti f T2,
where ti and T2 are the minimal and the maximal tax rate, respectively. It
seems reasonable to assume that there are always some taxes and that profits
are never taxed away completely. Substitution of (~), (9), (11) and then (4)
into (8) leeds to the following behavioural model for the firm:6
T
maximise J(1-Z(t))(1-i(t))pK(t) dt, 0~ i(.) C 1. (12) i(.) 0 - -
Substitution of (5) into (3) leads to L- l~W K and substitution of this




(l~~iT(t))~ K(t) at. o~ tl ~ T(.) ~ T2 ~ 1. (13)
i(.) o -
Substitutaon of (9), ( 11) end Lhen (4) ínto ( 6) leads to the dynamic
constraint
K - (1-t(t))i(t)~K(t). (14)
The strategic dynamic interaction between the government and the firm is
described by the differentiel game (12)-(14). This differential game is in
structure very similar to the Lancaster (19~3) game of capitalism, which was
further investigated by Hoel (1978), Pohjola (1983) end Ba~ar, Haurie and
Ricci (1985). The government plays the role of the workers and the firm
plays the role of the capitalists. In the next section several relevant
equilibria for the differentiel game (12)-(14) will be derived.
3. Strategic equilibria
In Lhis section game equilibria for the differentisl game (12)-(14) are
derived. It is essential to establish first, whether the mood of play is
cooperative or non-cooperative, whether the players act simultaneously or
sequentially, whether the players can commit themselves or not and what
information is available to the players (see BaSar and Olsder, 1982). It is
reasonable to assume here, that the game is non-cooperative and that the
government chooses the corporate~tax rate policy before the firm chooses the
investment rate policy. Therefore the Stackelberg solutíon concept seems
appropriate. The "open-loop" Stackelberg solution requires that the players
rnmmit Ihamselvea Prom tha heginning tn a etrategy Cor the wht7le períod and
tassumea that the players have no information on the "etate" of the system,
which is in this game the level of the capital atock. This solution displays
time-inconsistency ( see Kydland end Prescott, 19~~), which means that the
government will have an incentive to deviate from the announced policy at
some later point in tíme. The asaumption that each player in principle
reconsiders its strategy at each point in time requires that the pla,yers are
not committed to an announced strategy end that they have information on the
state of the system (this ís sometimes referred to as the requirement of
"strong time-consístency"; see Ba;ar, 1989). The requirement leada to the
"feedback" Stackelberg solution (see Simean and Cruz, 19~3). As will be
shown below, the feedback Stackelberg solution of the differentiel geme
(12)-(14) coincidea with both the open-loop and the feedback Nash solution.
For reasons of exposition the open-loop Nash solution will be presented
first. Finally, the efficient or Pareto optimal equilibria will be derived.
In this section it will be assumed that the maximal corporate tax rate T2 is
at least Z. -
Proposition 1
The open-loop Nash solution for the differential game (12)-(14) is given by
T(t) - T1, i(t) - 1, for t E[O,tN)
T(t) - T2, i(t) - 0, for t E(tN,T],
where tN - T - 1 P(1-T2).
(15)
Proof
The open-loop Nash solution results from the application of Pontryagin's
maximum principle for each player and the Nash equilibrium concept.
The Hamiltonian function for the maximisation problem of the government is
given by
HC(K.T.PC.t) - t(1~~'T)w ~ PG(1-T)i(t)}~K. (16)
It follows that the government's rational reaction to the strategy of the
firm is given by8
T(t) - zl. if w- P~(t)i(t) ( 0
T(t) - T2, if w- p~(t)i(t) ) 0
and that the costate p0 is gíven by the adjoint system




The Hamiltonian function for the maximisation problem of the firm is given
by
HF(K,i,pF,t) - {(1-T(t))(1-i) ~ pP(1-T(t))i}~K. (19)
It follows that the firm's rational reaction to the strategy of the
government is given by
i(t) - 0, if pP(t) - 1~ 0
i(t) - 1, if pF(t) - 1) 0 (20)
and that the costate pP is given by the adjoint syatem
PP(t) - -P((1-Z(t))(1-i(t)) 4 PF(t)(1-i(t))i(t)}
PF(T) - 0. (21)
In the open-loop Nash solution there is a period (tN,T] where i(t) - 0 end
thus T(t) - t2. The point in time tN can be found from the adjoint system
for the costate pF. Because it is assumed that t2 ) 2, so that T2 ) 1-2~,
the value of the costate p0 at tN is larger than W. F~rthermore, both co-
states pF and p0 are monotonically decreasing. It follows that before the
point in time tN 1(t) - 1 and t(t) - tl. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2
i) If tl ) 1-2~, the open-loop Stackelberg solution for the differential
game (12)-(14) with the government as leader and the firm as follower is
given by9
T(t) - T1, i( t) - 1, for t E[O,tÓ)
T(t) s T1, i(t) z 0, for t E ( tÓ,T], (22)
where tp - T - ~(11T1)
11) If T1 ( 1-Z~, the open-loop Stackelberg solution for the differential
game (12)-(14) with the government as leader and the firm as follower is
given by
T(t) - T1, i(t) - 1, for t E[O,ti)
1 T(t) dt - 2as1 over (ti,T], i(t) z 0, for t E(ti,T], (23)
where ti - T - 2~.
Proof
The proof resembles Pohjola's (1983) derivation of the open-loop Stackelberg
solution for the Lancaster game. However, Pohjola ia not correct in his
conclusion that the costate q0 (see below), which he denotes by z, changes
after the follower's policy switch.
The open-loop Stackelberg solution results from the sequentiel application
of Pontryagin's maximum principle and the Stackelberg equilibrium concept.
Wishart and Olsder's (19~9) result on discontinuoua Stackelberg solutiona is
used.
The firm is follower. The firm's rational reaction to the atrategy of the
government is already derived in the proof of proposition 1.
The Hamiltonian Function for the maximisation problem of the government is
now given by
HO(K.PF.T.P0.90.t) - {(1~~'T)w ~ PO(1-T)i(PF)}PK
- {(1-T)(1-i(PF)) ' PF(1-T)i(PF)}~90. (24)
It follows that the government's optímal strategy is given by
T(t) - T1 , if g(t) C 0
T(t) ~ T2. if g(t) ~ 0. (25)10
where
g(t) -{w - p~(t)i(t)}K(t) t{(1-i(t)) t pF(t)i(t)}qG(t), (26)
and that the costate q0 is given by the adjoint system
qG(t) z -P(1-T(t))L{PG(t)K(t) ~ (1-PF(t))9Q(t)}ap (t) - i(t)9G(tI]
F
q~(o) r o. (27)
where the derivative áPF(t) should be understood as ~(i(Ttt~) with b the
Dirac function and t the point of time where the firm awitchea from
investment to dividend. It follows that the costate qG is conatent end zero
before the switch-point t, and constant and non-zero after t. The value of
the co- state q~ after t
tih t~(h
qG(t~h) - J~7G(t) dt ~ J{PQ(t)K(t) t(1-PF(t))qQ(t))b(t-t) dt,
t-h t-h
with h) 0, can be found by partiel integration. The result is
qG(tah) - -pG,(t)K(t)~ (Z8)
It follows that g(t) -(W - pG(t))K(t) for t) t.
If tl ) 1-2a, then g(t) ( 0 and t(t) ~ tl for t) t, and the switch-point
for this case can be Found from the adjoint aystem for the coatate pF.
If tl C 1-Zá, then g(t) - 0 for t) t, and the awitch-point for thia case as
well as
J
T(t) dt - 2 ~~1 over (t,T] (z9)
can be found from the adjoint systems for the costates pG and pF with p~(t)
- 1. Q.E.D.
w
In proposition 2ii the government's strategy after ti is not unique. Due to
the error in the derivation this non-uniqueneas of the equilibrium was not11
found by Pohjola (1983). The government can choose, for example, an average
tax rate 1-2á or the government can choose to continue for a while with the
minimal tax rate T1 and then to switch to the maximal tax rate 22 at
S 2oc(1-tl)-1
t2 - T - ~(t2-T1) . (30)
Proposition 3
The feedback Stackelberg solution for the differential game (12)-(14) with
the government as leader and tlie firm as follower coincides with the open-
loop Nash solution.
Proof
The feedback Stackelberg solution results from the application of dynamic
programming and the Stackelberg equilibrium concept.
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations are given by
VBt(t,K) t max {{(láar-C)w t V~(t,K)(1-T)i}SK} z 0
i
(31)
VFt(t,K) t max {{(1-i)(1-i) ~ V~(t,K)(1-i)i}~K} . 0, (32)
i
where VG and VF are the value functíons for the government and the Firm,
respectively.
Because the rational reaction of the firm i does not depend on the action T
of the government, the feedback Stackelberg solution with the government as
leader and the firm as follower coincides with the feedback Nash solution.
It is easy to check, with value funtions V~(t,K) ~ pQ(t)K and VF(t,K) -
pF(t)K and with the proof of proposition 1, that this Stackelberg solution
also coincides with the open-loop Nash solution. This last result cen also
be derived as a consequence of state separability (Dockner, Feichtinger and
J~rgensen, 1985). Q.E.D.
Proposition 4
The Pareto optimal or efficient solutions for the differentiel game (12)-
(14) with a and (1-a), 0( a( 1, denoting the relative weighta of the12
objective functions of the government and the firm, respectively, are given
by
i) if a)(1-~)w, T(t) ~ T1, i(t) - 1, for t E[O,ti)
T(t) - t2, i(tr z 1, for t E ( ti,t2)
z(t) ~ T2, i(t) - 0, for t E ( t2,T],
where tP - T - and
2 p{~(1~~fT2)wF(1-a)(1-TZ)}
P P 1 ~(loc~~1)w
tl - t2 - P(1-i2)ln{~(la~;s2)wi(1-a)(1-T2)}
ii) if ~~(1-a)w, t(t) - T1, i(t) - 1, for t E[O,t3)
T(t) a T1, i(t) - 0, for t E(t3,T],




111) if a-(1-a)w, i(t) - T1, i(t) ~ 1, for t E[O,t4)
t(t) E[T1,T2], 1(t) - 0, for t E(t4,T], (35)
where t4 - T - ~.
Proof
The efficient or Pareto optimal solutions result from the application of
Pontryagin's maximum principle to the HemilLOnian functions
HP(K,T,i,p,t) z{~(1~~tT)w t(1-a)(1-T)(1-i) t p(1-T)i}SK (36)
wi th 0 C a( 1.
It follows that the optimal cooperative atrategy ia given by
1-a
1-~
i(t) - 0, if p(t) - 1 4 a~ 0
i(t) - 1, if p(t) - 1 ~ a) 0
T(t) - T1, íf W C max(p(t),1-~)13
t(t) - Tz, if w) max(p(t),1-a)
and that the costate p ia given by the adjoint system
P(t) - -P{J~(láa~t(t))W t (1-a)(1-T(t))(1-i(t))
~ p(t)(1-T(t))i(t)}
1~1 I i tt
(37)
Again there is a point in time where the firm switches from investment to
dividend. The value of the corporate tax rate t after that point in time
depends only on the value of A, since p(t) C 1-a. The switch-points for the
different values of a can then be found from the adjoint system for the co-
state p. If W G 1-a, then the value of the corporate tax rate t before that
switch-point is T1. If w) 1-~, then the government switches from the
minimal tax rate T1 to the maximal tax rate t2 at the point in time where
the costate p is equsl to W. Q.E.D.
In the next sections these results will be used for an analysis of the model
pre:;ented in scctíon 2.
4. The "best" eoployment policy
The best employment result is achieved, when the government and the firm
coopcratc with the total employoent over the planning period as common
objective. As can be seen from Proposition 41 with a s 1, this implies that
the firm only invests and dces not pay out dividend, which is to be
expected. However, in the situation of decentralised decision making the
best employment result is achieved in the open-loop Stackelberg behavioural
equilibrium. Under the assumption of Proposition 21, which means a labour
intensive technology or a high minimal corporate tax rate, the open-loop
Stackelberg solution is efficient but with full weight on the objective
funr~l I~~nnl r~t' Chr flrm (a - U ln 1'rot,t,Alt.lon 411). lt iN tu br~ ~,xlrocted thnt.
in this case only the minimal corporate tax rate ia levied. Under the
assumption of Proposition 2ii, which meana a capital intensive technology
with a low minimal corporate tax rate, the open-loop Stackelberg solution is
not efficient. The structure of the solution resembles the structure of the14
efficient solutions of Proposition 4i11, but the switch-point differs.
However, the open-loop Stackelberg solution dominatea the feedback
Stackelberg or open-loop Nash solution in the aense thet both players are
better off. The fact that the government ia better off is not aurprising,
since the leader in a open-loop Stackelberg game is always better off than
in the corresponding open-loop Nesh game. The firm is also better off. It is
easy to show that in both behavioural models the equilibrium value of the
firm's objective functional is equal to the level of the capital atock at
the switch-point (whích is equal,to the final level of the capital stock).
Furthermore, the firm invests longer in the open-loop Stackelberg
equilibrium than in the open-loop Nash equilibrium: tQ ) tN, ti ) tN. Figure
1 illustrates what happens. As open-loop Stackelberg equilíbrium the one
from proposition 211 with investment awitch ti end with tax switch t2,
according to equation (30), is chosen.
[Figure 1]
Two numerical examples might clarify the results. In example 1 the efficient
open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium from proposition 21 appears. In example 2
agaln the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium with investment awitch ti and
with tax switch t2 is chosen.
Example 1
Suppose w- 2, K(0) - 1, T- 8, t1 : 0.25. T2 ~ 0.75 and ac - 0.25.
[Table 1]
Example 2
Suppose w: 2, K(0) ~ 1, T- 8, t1 ~ 0.25, T2 a 0.75 and ac - 0.75.
[Table 2]
It is intereating to note that private employment as a percentage of total
employment increasea for the more efficíent outcomes. The reeaon is that the
more efficient outcomes have a longer period of investment.15
The by now well-known drawback of the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium is
that the leader's strategy is time-inconsiatent. It will be immediately
clear, that the government's optimal strategy after the firm has stopped
investing, at that point in time, is to levy the maximal corporate tax rate,
which is not prescribed by the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium. It follows
that the essential questions are, whether the government will deviate from
the announced tax policy or not and whether the firm will believe the
government's announcement or not. If the government can commit itself to an
announced policy or if the government has a atrong reputation, the open-loop
Stackelberg behavioural model is appropriate. If the government cannot
commit itself or has a bad reputation, the feedback Stackelberg or open-loop
Nash equilibrium results, which leads to worse outcomes for both employment
and the value of the firm. In this way benchmarks are set for the analysis
of the trade-off between commitments or reputation, on the one hand, and the
effectiveness of an employment policy, on the other hand.
5. Sensitivity for capital~labour intensiveness
Suppose that wages w and the bounds ti and i2 on the corporate tax rate T
are fixed. Because wages w are fíxed the elasticity paremeter a of the Cobb-
Dougles production function (1) represents the capital~labour íntensiveness
of the production technology in the model. For a close to zero the
production technology is very labour intensive and for a close to one the
production technology is very capital intensive. For the open-loop Nash or
feedback Stackelberg strategic equilibrium the point in time where the
switch occurs to a higher tax rate and the pay-out of dividends is given by
tN in proposition 1. For the open-loop Stackelberg strategic equilibrium
this switch point is given by tÓ in proposition 21 for a C 2(liT ) and by ti
- 1
in proposition 2ii for a) 2(11~1). With equation (5) these awitch points
are a function of a, the indicator of capital~labour intensiveneea.
It is easy to show that the rentability of the capital stock p, gíven by
equation (5), is minimal for a- 1-w with value 1-w and that l~i~m g- m and
lim p- 1. It is also eesy to ahow that ~ is maximal for a satisfying
aTl
a . ln{(1-a)W} - 0, (39)16
which implies a ) 1-w, and that lim ~~ 0 and lim a~ 1.
a~.0 ~ aTl ~
[Figure 2]
Figure 2 shows the switch points as a function of a, where w, il and i2 take
the same values as in examples 1 and 2. Since the graphs of tÓ and ti
intersect for a- 1 2
2(1-T )(- 3)~ it follows that the minimum of
1
tÓ and ti
represents the switch point for the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium as a
function of a. As was stated before, the switch point tN for the open-loop
Nash or feedback Stackelberg equilibrium lies uniformly under the switch
point min(tÓ,tl). Typical for both equilibria is that for a close to zero or
a very labour-intensive production technology the awitch occurs close to the
end of the planning horizon. In thia case the firm waita with the pay-out of
dividends until the very end of the planning period. The reasons are that
the long períod of investment leads to a large capital stock and that lim g
a],0
- , so that according to equation (4) the profits are very high. The
government is also satisfied, becauae the long period of investment end the
very labour-intensive production technology lead to a lot of private
employment, and high profits at the end lead to high tax revenues at the
end. For a close to one or s very capital-intenaive production technology
the switch occurs not so late, but later than for a mixed production
technology. In this case the government is willing to postpone a higher tax
rate, 1f the firm is willing to poatpone the pay-out of dividends, and vice
versa, in order to create higher future profits. In the open-loop Nash or
feedback Stackelberg equilibrium the switch occura the earliest for a- 1-w
(- 2). For the chosen values of w and T1 the same applies in the open-loop
Stackelberg equilibrium.
6. Conclusion
A dífferential geme is played between the government and a representative
firm. The firm wants to maximise the total stream of dividends and can
determine the inveatment rate. The government wants to maximise total
employment, which is the sum of public and private employment, and can
determine the corporate tax rate. If the government can commit itaelf or has17
n atrong reputatlon, the open-loop Stackelberg model ia the correcl.
behavioural model. Otherwise, the feedback Stackelberg model, which yields
the same strategies as the open-loop Nash model for this problem, ahould be
used. The feedback Stackelberg equilibrium leads to less accumulation of the
capital stock and gíves worse results for both the government and the firm.
In the absence of commitments the effectiveness of an employment policy
depends on the government's reputation. A very labour-intensive production
technology leads to a very ahort period of dividend paymenta. For a very
capital-intensive production technology the period of dividend payments is
also relatively short, but not so extremely short.
A first suggestion for further research is to extend the basic model and to
investigate the precise effects of an interest rate, a discount rate and
other production technologies. Afterwards the model should be embedded in a
more general macro-economic context.
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